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Abstract
In the exploration phase of Uganda’s oil project, controversy arose regarding the drilling
of wells on the grounds of important shrines of spirits of the adjacent Lake Albert. While
the oil companies and the state looked at the market value of the land, the claimants
emphasised its cultural heritage value, building a link to an international heritage dis-
cussion. This article argues that, while they have been barred from political influence on
the oil project, cultural institutions such as the Bunyoro Kingdom and the claimants in
the village near the controversial well used cultural heritage as a vantage point to get
their voices heard and to gain negotiating power in the project. The article shows how
widening of the definition of cultural heritage – which means dropping a bias for built
infrastructure – has put culture alongside politics, economics, and the environment as an
important factor to consider in extractive projects.
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Introduction
In Kaiso, a fishing village on the Ugandan shores of Lake Albert, the Irish oil company
Tullow Oil became embroiled in allegations regarding the destruction of a cultural site
during its drilling of the Ngassa oil wells.1 After drillings in 2007 and 2009, a faction of
the village’s residents started claiming the wells had destroyed a shrine or site of cultural
importance and angered the resident spirits. This article considers the case of Kaiso in
detail and sheds light on the asymmetric power dynamics in extractive industry projects,
but also the potential power cultural heritage claims can extend to marginalised groups
by giving them another framework under which to make their voices heard. Rather than
viewing these claims as foreign to the politics and economics of oil projects, this article
considers them as a way to take part in negotiations that usually marginalise the people
living on the profitable land.2 In essence, we argue that the controversies over cultural
sites go beyond the question of the protection of the cultural but are connected to quests
for domination over the land and the question of who should make decisions about it and
the kind of stakeholders involved.
Uganda is an up-and-coming oil producing state, with 6.5 billion barrels of oil where
exploration has led to frictions and struggles over land. Oil deposits were discovered along
the Albertine Graben in the Western parts of Uganda, especially in the Hoima and Buliisa
districts. Unlike many extractive projects, the pace of development has been slow, as the
oil project is caught in an enduring latency or “not-yet-ness” (Witte, 2017, 2018). More
than a decade after the first discoveries in 2006, no oil has yet been produced. Among
the claims raised by affected residents of the oil region3 against the oil companies during
their operations are those of destroyed crops, houses, and sites of cultural importance.
While the compensation for crops and houses can be based on market values, the com-
pensation for the destruction of sites of cultural importance is more difficult since the
assessment of cultural heritage claims is not a straightforward task.
First of all, Uganda is a country with a diversity of cultures as there are diverse tribes,
clans, and sub-clans (1995 Constitution: Third Schedule).4 Second, cultures are not
stable entities but are open to change and are constantly in the making. Some researchers
have suggested that neoliberalism in Uganda has brought about cultural re-engineering,
and capitalist tendencies have fundamentally reshaped values (Wiegratz, 2010: 123–
136). Third, Christian churches have an influence on the legitimacy of claims based on
traditional and non-Christian spirituality. Finally, from a legal perspective, the para-
meters of what should be protected as cultural are not clearly discernible in law and fact.
The Constitution of Uganda sets out that the state shall promote and preserve cultural
values and practices as long as these do not challenge fundamental rights and freedoms,
human dignity, or democracy (1995 Constitution: Objective XXIV). The recognition of
cultural heritage claims implies rights to compensation. These rights can come into
conflict with cost calculations of the oil project. As a result, the right to culture, as
provided for in the Constitution (1995 Constitution: Article 37), may be curtailed,
highlighting the power dynamics inherent in oil projects.
In the following, we first describe our methodology and then set out the conceptual
frame by situating the case in contemporary research on extractive projects and cultural
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policies. We then take a look at Uganda’s land tenure system and the process of land
acquisition. This will provide the background against which we can analyse the case of
the Ngassa wells in detail. In a final step, the article analyses these claims as part of
cultural politics of land worldwide that seek and sometimes succeed to include cultural
heritage as a factor into the calculations of large infrastructural projects next to politics,
economics, and environment.
Methodology
This article is based on an interdisciplinary collaboration between a lawyer and a social
anthropologist. Therefore, the methodology is qualitative, with a combination of
anthropological research and the doctrinal legal analysis, commonly used in law. The
doctrinal legal research uses the law as a framework of analysis, mainly focusing on laws
(statutory and more), legal theories, and decided cases. The methodology covered desk
review of literature and fieldwork. Furthermore, one of the authors is a commissioner
who actively participated in activities of the Commission of Inquiry into Lands.5 This
experience added perspective to this analysis, since the Commission’s investigations and
hearings exposed the pertinent issues concerning (compulsory) land acquisition. The
ethnographic fieldwork was done between 2012 and 2015 from Hoima, with many visits
to the communities on the shores of Lake Albert. The research encompassed interviews
with politicians at the LC1 level, workers in the oil industry, and cultural leaders, as well
as interviews at the district level with chairmen LC5 and at the national level with the
Petroleum Department of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development and the oil
companies active in the region and, most importantly, the company involved in the case
of the destroyed cultural sites. Additionally, the research involved participant observa-
tion during many workshops and conferences organised by civil society, during which
claims surrounding the use or expropriation of land and the destruction of cultural sites
were often raised.
Negotiating Values of Land in Extractive Projects
This article contributes to research on extractive projects by focusing on the values of
land in resource exploitation. An oil project can be seen as an “arena,” (Bierschenk and
Olivier de Sardan, 1997), in which different stakeholders, through their interactions and
negotiations, influence the present and future developments of the oil, and thus effec-
tively “make” the oil.6 The oil arena is not a stable entity but it is a social space con-
stituted by the relationships between the actors. New actors can be drawn into the arena
or others can decide to leave it. Some can join together as strategic groups to push their
agenda and influence the negotiation. Actors bring their own interests and power reg-
isters to the arena. One such register is the speech act of claiming the cultural heritage
value of the land.
Jannik Schritt (2016) has described the speech acts of naming, blaming, and claiming
for the oil arena in Niger as the seizing of oil as a new idiom by well-established political
actors who speak on behalf of the subaltern. We build on this understanding of claiming
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as a speech act by which all actors, not only politicians, emphasise their interests and the
rights they assume to have.7 Claiming cultural heritage sites can be seen as actors
mobilising a register in their negotiation in the oil arena. Interestingly, these are actors
that are less powerful than the state or the oil companies.
Seeing cultural sites as registers does not mean that they are merely tools and it does
not discount or diminish the value people ascribe to them. We understand value not as
something inherent to an object but as a process of ascription by individuals or groups
(Boholm and Corvellec, 2011: 178). However, whether people truly believe in the sites
or not is of less concern to this article than what people do by claiming that it is an
important site to them.
Generally, it is hard to overestimate the importance of land for livelihoods and its key
role in social and cultural functions in the lives of many (Nakayi, 2015). In Africa,
approximately 75 per cent of land is untitled (Wily, 2013: 12) and these lands are often
presented by politicians or investors as “empty land” waiting to be developed (Cotula,
2013: 86–87). While land without title may suggest that it is also without users and
owners, this idea of emptiness is not true now, nor was it ever, as most of these lands
were and are still owned by communities. Officially, in other jurisdictions, these unre-
gistered lands are often owned by the state or the government, granting use rights to the
customary owners (Wily, 2013: 13). In such cases, the state can assert its sovereign title/
rights against individuals/communities, but it is much harder for these individuals/
communities to retain their right to the land vis-a`-vis a nation state in developmental
gear. Unfortunately, the state does not always effectively represent the interests of the
resident communities, especially when the market value of the land has increased due to
the prospects of a large extractive project.
In extractive projects, both the state and operating companies are seen to be
responsible for the safeguarding of citizens against the negative effects of oil exploration
and exploitation. Therefore, there are standards of land acquisition that include a process
called an environmental impact assessment (EIA) or environmental and social impact
assessment (ESIA) (Cotula, 2013: 99). EIAs or ESIAs signify a (rediscovered) aware-
ness of the implications that such large infrastructure projects have for the people and the
environment in which the project is situated. The implementation of EIAs is founded on
increasing international pressure on companies to act socially and environmentally
responsible as part of their corporate social responsibility (CSR).8 CSR is a common
corporate practice in capitalist countries of the global “West” or “North” that emerged in
the 1990s and is closely linked to shareholder activism and financialisation (Welker and
Wood, 2011). CSR has gained currency in the developing world, with debates on it
becoming pertinent in efforts to boost business, industrialisation, and the extractives
(Visser, 2008). However, CSR is a practice that can only superficially display respon-
sibility, while at the same time extending corporate power by reframing social questions
in line with corporate business agenda (Rajak, 2011: 13).9
During the exploration for oil, vast stretches of land have to be surveyed in order to
determine appropriate places for test drilling. These seismic surveys involve a temporary
disturbance of the people who live on this land, as security measures prohibit them from
working their farms or fishing during the surveying. Many studies have shown how
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communities suffer from oil exploration through the destruction of their environment,
which is usually the basis for their economic activities, especially farming and fishing
(Breglia, 2013; Reed, 2009; Sawyer, 2004). However, responses by the state are mostly
characterised by a desire to ease oil exploration activities at all costs.
In this context, claiming cultural heritage sites could also be seen as a part of the
“weapons of the weak” (Scott, 1985). The subaltern, subdued by more powerful actors
and ignorant of the detailed and complicated contracts, procedures, and processes of oil
projects, draw on means closer to them to fight the negative impacts of such projects.
While strikes or protests are known from other countries, such as Nigeria, the claiming of
cultural heritage emerges in the case discussed in this article as another way of seeking
attention, respect, and support from more powerful actors. However, it is necessary to
note that the concept might slightly romanticise the unity on both sides of the power
spectrum. The weak or subaltern in this case are less powerful than the state or the oil
company, but they are quite a diverse group including well-connected national civil
society activists and even the King of Bunyoro.10 Furthermore, comparing the claiming
to a strategy of foot dragging or sabotage to gain marginal (material) gains could mean
undermining the cultural and religious value of the sites to the people claiming them.
Nevertheless, the concept helps show that extractive communities are not entirely dis-
empowered, passive, and hopeless and that they can join in the resource-making and
connect to international discourses by invoking cultural heritage and CSR to improve
their position in the oil arena.
While CSR and ESIAs pay attention to the environmental and social repercussions, a
factor that is still only partially represented is the cultural value connected to land –
especially landscapes that lack architectural cultural manifestations. Therefore, such
sites are at risk of being destroyed unintentionally during seismic surveys or drilling.
UNESCO not only protects (built) cultural sites but also protects cultural landscapes.
Since 1992, UNESCO has recognised cultural landscapes as protection-worthy since
they represent the “combined works of nature and of man” (Article 1 of the World
Heritage Convention) and they show the interrelated development of natural environ-
ment and human social, economic, and cultural forces. Cultural landscapes refer to sites
that showcase a specific technique of land use and sustain biological diversity or are
associated with beliefs and customs. In order to protect such relations between humans
and their environment and the pertaining cultural practices, cultural landscapes were
inscribed in the World Heritage List.11
The definition, given in Annex 3 of the World Heritage Convention, states further that
the term covers a diversity of manifestations of such interactions between the humans
and the natural environment. It stresses not only the sustainability of land-use practices
that have evolved over time but also the spiritual relation with nature (UNESCO, 2008:
Annex 3). Examples of such landscapes are the Uluru-Kata Tjuta National Park in
Australia or the Khomani Cultural Landscape in South Africa.12 Masquelier (2002)
described such sites as “mystical geography,” in which physical landmarks are not
neutral but constitute “a complex phenomenal reality anchored in people’s active
involvement with the invisible forces that surround them” (Masquelier, 2002: 839). The
cultural sites named in the Ngassa case that this article discusses could potentially fall
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under the third category of the World Heritage Convention: the cultural landscape. These
sites may include landscape considered to be sacred that is not visible to an unknowing
eye. As the principal private secretary of the Omukama, the King of Bunyoro, put it in an
interview with Witte in 2012: “Our cultural sites are not of stones like cathedrals in
Europe. People know to which stone to pray to. African history is not in ruins or rubble.”
The case we discuss in this article looks at the role that cultural sites play in the
negotiation of rights to compensation by an extractive industry project in Uganda.
Cultural sites or shrines have long been a feature of settlement and an important part of
making claims on land, as Lentz (2013: 16–17) showed for Ghana and Burkina Faso. A
major question that arises when defining cultural landscapes in Uganda is who has the
authority to attest spiritual relations between humans and nature.
The next section considers the legal framework in which claims to land (and hence
compensation) can be made. This legal background is important in order to understand
the framework in which the negotiations of the extractive project and the different acts of
claiming the economically and culturally valuable land took place.
Uganda’s Land System
The biggest challenges of Uganda’s landholding system arise from the existence of
multiple tenures and various layers of rights on the same piece of land, coupled with the
lack of documents of title to land for some people, especially those holding land under
the customary land tenure system. The current reforms under the 1995 Constitution and
the Land Act of 1998 resurrected the previously impugned tenures and also reformed the
law on leaseholds. The land system now recognises four land tenures: customary,
leasehold, freehold, and mailo.
Mailo land dates back to an agreement signed in 1900 between Buganda and the
British government during colonialism (Joireman, 2007). Under customary tenure, a
specific class of people holds land on the basis of customary rules acceptable to its
members, allowing for local customary regulation and communal ownership and use in
perpetuity (Land Act: section 3). Uganda’s freehold tenure has its origins from the
English freehold system. It is a tenure that allows for perpetual holding of land or for
a period less than perpetuity on set terms and conditions (Land Act: section 3(2)).
Leasehold tenure arises where the landowner(s) grant(s) another person the right to
exclusively possess land for a period of time on set terms and conditions (Land Act:
section 5). Except for Mailo land tenure, which is predominantly in the Buganda region,
it is common to find more than two types of tenures in a given geographical area, such as
Bunyoro (Troutt et al., 1992: 16–17).
This multiple tenure system creates ample opportunities for land grabbing, mainly
through fraud where certificates of titles are made on land already titled as mailo, or
where freehold certificates of title are issued to persons other than the customary owner
and occupiers of land without any sort of title (Mwebaza, 1999: 6). It has been argued
that customary tenure cannot completely disappear even where it is converted into
freehold, “customary tenure is associated with many customs and taboos that may
continue to apply even after the land has been converted to freehold” (Mwebaza, 1999:
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6). The “customary practices and beliefs” (Mwebaza, 1999: 6) do not easily change with
the changes in the registration status of the land. The dual claims to the same land have
been a great contributor to land grabbing and land disputes, as revealed by the ongoing
investigations on reported cases before the Commission of Inquiry into land.13
Major reforms have aimed to redress the above-mentioned challenges (McAuslan,
2013; Shivji, 1998: 62). There have been two major land reform regimes since indepen-
dence: the Land Reform Decree under President Idi Amin in 1975 and the 1995 Consti-
tution through the Land Act of 1998 under current President Yoweri K. Museveni. The
Land Reform Decree envisaged promoting easy transferability of land (through periodic
leases) such that it could facilitate economic development (Land Reform Decree, 1975;
Mugambwa, 2007: 44). Under the 1975 land law regime, land became a public commodity
vested in the State and managed by the Uganda Land Commission. Therefore, perpetual
rights to land, which arise in freehold, mailo, and customary tenures, were replaced with
periodic leaseholds with development conditions. The effect of this was that individual
claims of rights to land would easily be defeated by development imperatives.
The above reforms in the Land Act, the 1995 Constitution, and the situation on the
ground have led to a multiple tenure system for Uganda, which promotes diversities in
rights and obligations for land owners (and users) depending on the tenure under which
one holds land. There are also diversities in the law applicable, where written law
applies mainly to the Mailo, freehold, and leasehold landholding systems, whereas
customary law applies to customary tenure. The relatively different institutional
framework among some tenure systems, coupled with different norms and applicable
rules, means differentiated treatment in situations of compensation. Compensation is
easier to prove entitlement under tenures such as mailo, freehold, and leasehold (where
there is registration) than under the customary system. Until the discovery of oil in
Bunyoro, customary tenure was highly informal and less documented by certificate of
title and therefore hard to prove.
Oil discovery in 2006 led to increased application for freehold titles in 2006, 2007,
and 2008 (Naringiyimana et al., 2019: 165, 188) and to land conflicts (Auge´ and Nakayi,
2014: 12). The discovery of oil brought about large-scale land acquisitions in Bunyoro,
bringing about what Niringiyimana et al. called a “curse of land dispossession”
(Naringiyimana et al., 2019: 166). This is the dispossession of genuine landowners of
their land without compensation, where compensation that is paid to those with frau-
dulently acquired titles to land has increased. A 2011 study by the NGO consortium
Uganda Land Alliance claimed that almost half their respondents had reported land
encroachment and land grabbing and that land disputes had increased by almost one-
third since the discovery of oil (CRED, 2015: 5). The next section of this article looks at
the role of land in Uganda’s oil project and particularly at the process of compensation
for land or temporary land use.
Land Acquisition and Uganda’s Oil Project
Under its Vision 2040, Uganda aims to move out of the category of low-income
countries by concentrating on the extractive sector of oil and gas as well as on
228 Africa Spectrum 54(3)
tourism and on infrastructure development (National Planning Authority, 2013: iii). Oil
exploration and infrastructure development all require land that is held either by the
government or by private persons. This land can be obtained through compulsory land
acquisition processes, as stipulated by the law (1995 Constitution, Article 26(2): Land
Acquisition Act). As in other big extractive projects, the oil companies active in
Uganda – Tullow,14 Total, and CNOOC – ran ESIAs to consider their impact on
society and the environment before starting land acquisition for drilling wells and
establishing a camp site. Generally, the process of land acquisition starts once the ESIA
grants its approval. The acquisition of land in Uganda for the oil project, whether for
these surveys or the construction of infrastructure, involves measurement of the land
and the filling of consent forms before compensation is paid. However, the reality of
compensation is less straightforward.
Uganda’s legal framework on land acquisition is dispersed in a number of laws and
policies, including the 1995 Constitution, Land Acquisition Act, Land Act, and the
Uganda Land Policy. The Land Acquisition Act provides for the processes and proce-
dures by which land may be taken over by government. Processes of government land
acquisition or temporary use of private land in the public interest require efforts to
balance the various functions of land and divergent stakes on it, including private rights.
These processes and outcomes are highly shaped by political imperatives (Meinert and
Kjaer Mette, 2016). Several can be characterised as land grabbing.
Furthermore, the Land Acquisition Act is relatively outdated. A recent legal challenge
to it led to a declaration that it was void insofar as it does not provide for payment of
adequate compensation prior to the government’s taking land from a person, as required
under the 1995 Constitution.15 In this case, the act of taking land for the construction of
the Kaiso–Tonya Road in the oil region prior to compensating its owners was found to be
contrary to the Constitution.16 Article 26(1) and (2) of the 1995 Constitution embeds
principles of fairness in cases of land acquisition, under its. The article emphasises that
the taking should be for a public purpose, with adequate compensation paid before taking
property, and the person deprived of property should have access to courts of law in case
she/he feels aggrieved in the process.
Compensation is at two levels: compensation for the land itself using values set by the
chief government valuer, and compensation for developments on land and crops set by
the District Land Board. Among the functions of the District Land Board under section
59(1(e)) of the Land Act are setting rates and adjusting them periodically depending on
the reigning circumstances or taking rates of inflation into account. Disputes on com-
pensation rates were intended to be resolved by District Land Tribunals (Land Act:
section 76(1(b)) using a guiding framework for computing compensation set in section
77 of the Land Act. The framework makes a distinction between values for buildings in
urban areas (at open market rates) and rural areas (“depreciated replacement cost”).
Also, customary land is rated at open market value. The District Land Tribunals do not
exist in reality, and their intended roles are fulfilled by Chief Magistrates Courts. The
compensation rates were an issue of contention throughout the oil region in 2012 and
2013 because old compensation rates had been used. Given the level of inflation in
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Uganda and the increased demand for land in the oil region, the compensation sums
could not buy another similar piece of land.
According to public statements by government officials and the oil companies at civil
society conferences, cultural sites should also be compensated. A good example of this
was when an official from the Petroleum Exploration and Production Department17
stated during a civil society conference that people should get compensated for cultural
sites “up to the level of the disturbance”18. The Petroleum (Exploration, Development
and Production) Act 2013 states to the effect that a landowner is entitled to fair and
reasonable compensation for any disturbance or deprivation of use of the land (The
Petroleum Exploration and Production Act (PEPA), 2013: section 139(1a)). Such
compensation has to be made within four years from the date it accrued (PEPA, 2013:
section 139(3)). Contrary to public reassurances, there is no stipulation for compensation
for “cultural sites” as such. Compensation in the above law is for land or disturbance on
land and it is not clear whether this extends to cultural sites. If an ESIA mentions cultural
sites, however, they are supposed to be circumvented or the people claiming these sites
should be assisted in transferring their valuable items.
Cultural sites have not been defined in any law of Uganda, although the Uganda
National Culture Policy recognises their value for socio-economic development (Min-
istry of Gender Labour and Social Development, 2006: 8). This policy recognises that
cultural sites can be natural or man-made. The policy promotes participatory approaches
to the preservation of cultural sites that include the private sector, communities, and civil
society organisations. Among the challenges in the promotion and protection of cultural
sites in Uganda are the limited efforts to have all of them documented, well maintained,
and popularised (PEPA, 2013: 8–10).
The cultural sites discussed in this article fall under the Kingdom of Bunyoro. The
cultural leaders of Bunyoro have no official political say on what happens on “their” land
in the process of oil exploration.19 Nonetheless, cultural leaders in Uganda, including
Bunyoro, demanded a share in the oil revenues. However, they cannot, as of right, claim
pecuniary advantage from oil revenues. Under the laws of Uganda, minerals, petroleum,
and other resources are vested in the government to hold and exploit for the people (1995
Constitution, Article 244). Under the Oil and Gas Revenue Management Policy, oil
revenues are shared in a transparent manner with the local governments in the areas
where oil activities take place; these are entitled to 7 per cent of the revenues since they
are most likely to suffer the social consequences of oil activities (MFPED, 2012: 26).
While cultural institutions are not recognised as entities entitled to a percentage directly
from the government, local governments can decide to allocate a share of the royalty to
recognised cultural institutions (MFPED, 2012: 28). Therefore, allocation of any revenue
is not mandatory but at the discretion of the local government and the Ministry.
While cultural institutions had no official rights and were supposed to be politically
abstinent, officials of Bunyoro Kingdom were present in dialogues held by civil society
and the oil companies in the oil region. Furthermore, the oil companies participated in
events like the empaango, an anniversary of the coronation ceremony, in Bunyoro. This
is indicative of the fact that the companies recognised the cultural entity as one worthy of
relating with for the “social licence to operate.”20 So, although Bunyoro was blocked
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from politically participating in the oil arena, the affirmation of cultural values and the
revival of cultural practices still had the potential to influence the oil-making. Indeed, the
Bunyoro Kingdom supported the push for compensation based on cultural heritage
claims. In the next section, we describe in detail the case of the Ngassa well, which
revolves around the recognition and compensation of cultural sites.
The Case of the Ngassa Well
On the shores of Lake Albert lies the small fishing village of Kaiso. Through the oil
project, the village was finally connected by tarmac road to Hoima and Kampala. The
community hosted a camp by Tullow Oil that was fenced off from its surroundings and,
despite its closeness, was difficult for its neighbours to access.21 The Ngassa well was (it
has since been re-naturalised in accordance with contract obligations) situated on the
outskirts of the village and could be reached along a narrow sand road. The road was
built with a special technique that allowed heavy machinery to pass without making a
permanent road that would be difficult to re-naturalise.22 The well itself was fenced off
and guarded, and during the time of the first research visits, a Christmas tree23 was
standing in place (see Figure 1).
In order to drill the Ngassa test wells in Kaiso, Tullow conducted an ESIA, which in
accordance with the local leadership (here the LC1 of Kaiso) allowed for the drilling on
this site.24 The well was meant to tap into oil pockets that extended under the lake.
However, after the drilling, the Abayaga25 and Abayagakati26 clans started making
claims on that site, saying Tullow had destroyed several cultural sites, including one
named after the spirit Ijomuka.27 It is understood from interviews that the site did not
involve any buildings but consisted of certain stones and was generally known to be a
place of worship, although it was not visible to an outsider. The clan had raised the issue
several times with the community liaison officer (CLO) of Tullow before finally putting
their claims in writing. They wrote two letters of complaint, one in July 2009 and another
in November 2011, which were shown to Witte by one of the complainants, who was also
involved in other compensation claims around the construction of the new road. The
complainants expressed their sorrow that the spirits had been enraged and that the leaders
could not perform appeasing rituals because the area was fenced off. The complainants
demanded that Tullow restore the site and compensate them or at least give them
monetary assistance to perform a ritual for the spirits.
In interviews with Witte, some cultural leaders – that is, locally recognised custodians
of tradition of the community – claimed that the spirits appeared to them in their dreams
and that people had already died due to the angry spirits. Even in neighbouring Kyehoro,
it was said that there were deadly accidents on the lake due to the destruction. However,
it is important to note that these claims were only supported by a faction of the village,
while another faction, including the Chairman LC1, insisted the sites no longer existed.
They claimed that the demands were purely economically motivated while the sup-
porters of the sites alleged the denial were caused by a general dismissive stance towards
traditional beliefs.
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The angered spirits not only affected the locals. The cultural leaders claimed they
had also caused trouble for the oil company at this well. The cultural leader of Kaiso
asserted that they would never get oil at that well and that their machines would always
break down and that millions would be wasted. As it happened, Tullow did have
problems drilling the Ngassa well (Tullow Oil Plc, 2007: 3). In 2014, Tullow decided
to abandon the well, claiming it to be uneconomic due to complex geology, despite the
company’s high expectations and having spent US$67 million on it. In August 2015,
the well and the sand road that led there were closed and the “natural” or former state
was restored or simulated. Overall, the oil industry had started slowing down and a
drop in global oil prices has meant also a decline for Tullow, a company that is heavily
dependent on the financial market (Witte, 2018: 202).
In the end, it seems the prophecies became true and the spirits won back their realm.
With the closure, the cultural leaders abandoned their compensation claims, even though
they had not received any compensation for the destruction. Although the site was now
open to public access, Witte was told that the cultural leaders had not performed any
ritual there. This inactivity was perceived by the faction opposing the cultural sites claim
as evidence that the concern had been motivated by economic gains all along.28
A cultural leader from the neighbouring village of Mbegu agreed with the claims made by
the cultural leader from Kaiso. He asserted in an interview with Witte in 2013 that the
Chinese – most likely BGP, a Chinese company that did the seismic survey – had destroyed
cultural sites during a seismic survey for Tullow. The leader explained that the Chinese had
come with their own spiritual powers and that they had destroyed many places of spiritual
importance but had failed at Ngassa, where the stronger Ugandan spirits had prevailed.
Figure 1. The Ngassa Well in Kaiso (Picture copyright Annika Witte, 2013).
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Tullow’s reaction to these claims was to delegate responsibility to the state and to
weaken the claims. The Stakeholder Engagement Manager of Tullow, who was the
former CLO of the concerned area, said in an interview with Witte in 2013 that the
company was aware of the issue but that the government should verify whether any
cultural sites had been destroyed before Tullow paid compensation. Furthermore, he
stressed that the site was not noted during the ESIA, when many consultations had been
made but no one had mentioned it. However, he agreed that it was true that the site had
been a cultural site decades ago, “where they would go and perform their cultural stuff.”
He added that these religions had been abandoned.
[T]hat sort of behaviour, those cult-like [ . . . ] religion was abandoned. But with the advent
of oil and gas they try to say ‘Aah, this used to be our site.’ There is nothing which was
found there anyway. But they’ll always tell you that ‘This was desecrated’.
He then pointed out the factions in the village and the lack of consent about the sites
but that the matter had been handed over to the Government nonetheless as it was the
Government’s project. He then highlighted the market value of the land: “The issue was
very simple. You know, if Tullow is going to pay money for compensation of such
things, it’s a recoverable cost, Government has to approve it.” Finally, he insisted that the
claims must be genuine for Tullow to support them.
But besides there is real need to have genuine claims. We have worked at previous sites
where real tangible things are seen and [ . . . ] the people have been supported to transfer
their valued what? Items. There was nothing to transfer that site, ok? Just to claim that ‘We
used to go there’. That’s it.
Questioning the veracity or relevance of the claims was also the reaction from a
political representative. Asked in an interview about the claims of the Abayaga and
Abayagakati, the then-Chairman LC5 of Hoima said he had heard about it but hoped
it was not speculation:
People trying to make some quick money [ . . . ] and they are saying ‘We had a cultural site
here and we want’. You could, if you allow even that now, you could end up with a thousand
cultural sites coming up with every small house becoming a cultural site. So you need to go
slow over that to really establish which one, which one exactly where. [ . . . ] But with the
advent of Christianity also many of those former old cultural practices have died out.
Oil companies and state authorities like the LC both displayed mistrust about the
complainants and regarding claims about such cultural sites. Generally, discussions
about compensation for cultural sites, witnessed during meetings between oil companies
and communities or civil society conferences, always involved a substantial amount of
mistrust. Communities mistrusted the companies to respect their values and to compen-
sate them fairly, while the companies and the government feared that people just made
up cultural sites to get more compensation.
In brief, a lack of clarity in the approach to designating and recording cultural sites in
Uganda’s history to date and the absence of a comprehensive database allow for
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conjecture on matters of cultural sites. This problem cannot be delinked from land use
planning. If the country had a comprehensive land use plan, land used for cultural sites
would be demarcated, limiting arguments about their existence or non-existence.
Attention to land use planning is something of recent times, revived during the pass-
ing of the Uganda National Land Use Policy in 2006, which declares the whole country
a planning area. Therefore, no land use plans are available that could corroborate
claims of land having or having had spiritual importance such as the discussed cultural
sites in Bunyoro (Ministry of Lands Housing and Urban Development, 2006). Fur-
thermore, as the LC5, quoted above, stated: easy acceptance of claims could lead to a
proliferation of cultural sites that would either cost a lot of money or even stall the
exploration completely.
Indeed, there are intentions to turn the whole of Lake Albert into a sacred site. In
2015, a report was submitted to the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights
funded by the European Union. The study highlights how communities in Hoima and
Buliisa are “reviving their traditional practices and customary governance system for the
protection of sacred natural sites around Lake Albert” (Chenells and Nadal, 2015).
Before we turn to a broader discussion, let us take a more detailed look at the positions
these actors have taken in the oil arena and the registers they draw on. First, on the side of
the claimants, incorporating the arrival of oil companies and widespread oil exploration
into the belief system by representing a seismic survey as a war between foreign and
local spirits can be seen as an indicator of the gravity of disturbance. Reports of the
coming of foreign spirits is nothing new in Bunyoro where, for example, certain spirits
called Enjungu had been attributed to the Europeans after their first arrival (von Weichs,
2013: 91). Concern over the expected loss of traditional culture that is aired by the leader
of Mbegu has also been voiced by many Banyoro, although in this case the local spirits
came out victorious having forced the foreign spirits out.
Notably, in his interview statement, Tullow’s manager did not entirely reject the
claims. Indeed, he agreed that the sites did actually exist once but he defended Tullow’s
position from three angles. First, he deflected blame from Tullow to the government. The
government was to decide as it was ultimately Uganda’s money that would be used for
compensation. Stipulated in production sharing agreements, the oil companies pay first
but then recover that money later through oil production. Second, the Tullow manager
projected the importance of the sites into the past by saying that the sites had been real at
some point in time but that people had stopped using them. This argument relates to a
common discourse in Uganda shaped by widespread Pentecostalism against traditional
beliefs, labelling them as backward, harmful or even criminal (Vorho¨lter, 2014: 163–
164). Nevertheless, beliefs in witchcraft are common and serve as one possible expla-
nation for misfortune and disaster (Behrend, 2007). Third, the manager sought to
delegitimise the claims based on a specific understanding of cultural sites that only
recognises tangible items.
The manager did point out correctly that the village was divided on the question of the
relevance of the cultural sites. Not all residents still believed in their importance. Since
the sites were not noted in the ESIA, it is likely that dissenting voices were not raised or
not heard. This points to a serious challenge with these assessments, as they presume
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communities to be whole entities that can uniformly decide on such questions. They
disregard internal struggles for power and underestimate the contentious nature of land
and cultural values, even within one community. Therefore, the representativeness of
these assessments relies heavily on the impartiality of those undertaking it and their
ability to create committees that balance all the factions that any village, whether in
Uganda or elsewhere, necessarily has.
The oil exploration activities were widely publicised and this provided a platform for
voices in defence of cultural sites in the oil region in Bunyoro, and an opportunity for
revived consciousness about them. Together with cultural leaders, including the Omu-
kama, the Ugandan NGO National Association for Professional Environmentalists
created a map of cultural sites in Bunyoro (NAPE, 2012). As mentioned in the con-
ceptual frame, such culturally loaded landscapes or “mystical landscapes” (Masqulier,
2002) are recognised or recognisable by the UNESCO heritage listing. Even in the public
hearing of the ESIA report for the Kingfisher oil field in June 2019, Bunyoro’s Culture
Minister Hajji Bruhani Kyokuhaire reminded the audience, which included the oil
company CNOOC that important cultural sites of Bunyoro, such as royal tombs and
burial grounds, were under threat of destruction (Okello, 2019). Therefore, the contro-
versy speaks to the politics of oil but also to discussions of human and cultural rights
(Bergs and Peselmann, 2015; Hauser-Scha¨ublin and Bendix, 2015).
In the following, we discuss this case in comparison with other cases of attempts of
establishing cultural sites or landscapes in Uganda and elsewhere. We show how these
claims are not mere attempts at money-making but reveal power dynamics centred on the
value of the right to land and possibilities of enforcing it. We analyse the speech act of
claiming of cultural sites as a register used to influence power dynamics in the oil arena.
Land, Cultural Heritage, Power
The speech acts of claiming discussed in this article and the struggles of the communities
must be viewed in the wider context of the effects of oil operations on host communities
and how the state responds. For example, in Uganda, there have been various attempts to
amend the Constitution Article 26 to relax the requirement for adequate fair compen-
sation for land prior to taking it from its owner(s) (World Bank, 2017: paras 37 and 43).
The argument is that this requirement leads to delays in the inception of government
projects due to lack of funds for compensation. The denial of cultural sites then becomes
a convenient way to dispense with obligations that may arise from the recognition of
such sites like having to pay compensation.
The statement made by Tullow’s manager, cited above, that there was nothing
valuable at the Ngassa well and that hence all the claims were unfounded and mere
money-seeking, builds on an old-fashioned understanding of cultural sites. Recognition
as a cultural site or cultural landscape is a negotiation process, which brings to the fore
argumentations of what is considered valuable and worthy of protection. The definition
of what is “valuable” may differ between insiders and outsiders of a community and even
within one community, as the case of Kaiso shows.
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In a study on the destruction of a ceremonial landscape in the United States, Stoffle et al.
(2004) described how Native Americans did not get their site acknowledged before the
construction of the Hoover Dam. In the 1990s then, an environmental impact study was
conducted for potential sites of new bridges across the Colorado River that should reduce
traffic on the Hoover Dam. Next to the EIA, the US Federal Highway Administration
consulted Native Americans. However, it was not satisfied when they claimed that all
proposed options for the siting of the bridge would destroy a ceremonial landscape. Despite
the results of the EIA, the construction of the bridge went ahead. Only later were the sites
recognised as “traditional cultural properties” (Stoffle et al., 2004: 138). In a reanalysis of
this case, Boholm and Corvellec (2011: 184) illustrated how the definition of what is a risk is
contingent on who considers what to be of value. Economic interests prevailed over the risk
narrative of the Native Americans. This highlights the importance of power dynamics and
the registers that marginalised groups can draw on to get a say in big economic projects on
their lands. In this case, the public authorities did not recognise the value of the ceremonial
landscape and therefore also rejected the idea of it being at risk (of destruction).
In the Ugandan case, the fact that the wells were drilled and the reactions from Tullow
and the state show that they did not recognise the sites. While the Abayaga and
Abayagakati sought to convince all relevant parties in the village and the government
that the cultural sites were at risk and that their destruction carried risks for both the
communities and the oil project, their narrative was rejected. While that case was lost,
the mentioned attempt of converting the whole of Lake Albert into a sacred site points to
the ongoing role of cultural heritage claims in the politics of Uganda.
However, there have been successful cases where cultural heritage claims were
accepted and risks connected to their destruction were taken seriously. Cultural heritage
plays an important role in Uganda but currently the only cultural heritage site is the
Kasubi Tombs of Buganda kingdom situated in Kampala. Recognition of cultural sites is
not an automatic process. Below, we look briefly at another case of cultural sites that
were destroyed during an infrastructure project to draw out the differences that recog-
nition of cultural sites can make. While the case of the Ngassa well is based on ethno-
graphic data, we do not have these kind of data for these other cases. Although we can
only reconstruct the cases from what is known in the public domain, we think it is
important to consider them as they are legal precedents and can have a decisive impact
on future infrastructure or extractive projects in Uganda.
This can be seen in the preservation of Embuga Ya Nsereko Kalamazi Basajja Subi
Namwama, which is the ancestral place for the Kkobe clan of Buganda (hereafter
“Embuga Ya Nsereko”) (UETC and SMEC, 2011: 132). In order to increase electricity
supply in Uganda from 5 per cent to 15 per cent and also be in position to sell electricity
to Rwanda and Tanzania, Uganda constructed the Kawanda-Masaka 220-kV power line
under a project funded by the World Bank (UETC and SMEC, 2011: 1). The line was to
pass through cultural sites. Some of the people who would be affected agreed to the idea
of relocating their sites as long as such processes were preceded by rituals for appea-
sement of the spirits (UETC and SMEC, 2011: 38). The general belief was that if the
rituals were not performed, no activity would take place on the sites; the spirits would be
a stumbling block similar to what has been claimed by the cultural leaders in Kaiso since,
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if not appeased, spirits fight to guard their territory. Beliefs that spirits have potential to
curtail projects or activities conducted on land without their approval are not new. For
example, bulldozers that were brought to work on the extension of the Masaka West
substation in Kabukero village broke down, purportedly due to spirits (UETC and
SMEC, 2011: 38).
Eventually, Mbuga Ya Nsereko, together with some 23 commercial cultural shrines
and 81 burial sites, were protected despite not being listed as cultural sites by UNESCO
or appearing on any national listing. The power line was diverted to save the site. In
effect, the line, which would be 135 km as per the 2006 feasibility study, ended up being
137 km, as a result of the diversions. Given the genuine concerns, couched in the lan-
guage of culture, implementers of the Kawanda–Masaka 220-kV power line found it
more convenient to divert the line rather than relocate the sites or compensate. The logic
behind the success of this is that there would be no equivalence between the loss suffered
as a result of destruction of the site and the money paid in compensation.
The examples in this article point to the fact that the Buganda Kingdom has, more
than any other traditional entity in Uganda, achieved recognition of cultural sites and
their preservation. Among the factors that may explain this is Buganda’s historical
political and geographical position within Uganda as well as good mobilisation strategies
that draw on notions of cultural belonging. Furthermore, in the case of the power line, the
World Bank, which may have more rigid standards on protection of cultural sites, was
involved. Additionally, a change of the geographical positioning of the line might be
more easily achieved than the drilling of a well. Seismic surveys usually identify the
most promising position to drill, and changing this could be more challenging and could
even defeat the purpose of the entire drilling exercise, as compared to adding a few
kilometres to a power line.
In this section, we have shown that the controversies over cultural sites go beyond the
question of the protection of the cultural but are connected to power dynamics and quests
for domination over the land and the question of who should make decisions about it and
the kind of stakeholders involved. Land is as much a political as an economic resource.
Staking claims, as the Abayaga and Abayagakati did in conjunction with Bunyoro king-
dom and NGOs, is a political act in the oil arena. They can be read as demands for the
participation in the oil revenues but couched in cultural terms. In this way, the kingdoms in
Uganda that have been banned from politics and delegated to the cultural realm re-enter
the political arena. They may not be part of the political landscape if politics are narrowly
construed, but if we understand politics more broadly than Uganda’s division into politics
and culture, as is a common perspective in social anthropology, we can see in this case how
the cultural dimension of land is emphasised to stake claims on it and therewith on the
political and economic development of the country.
Conclusion
This article has offered an example of the politicisation of economically profitable land
through cultural means. By analysing a controversy over the destruction of cultural sites
during oil exploration in Uganda’s oil region, we have shown that cultural institutions,
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which have been barred in Uganda from taking on political roles, have re-entered the
political arena through speech acts of claiming cultural heritage sites on land in the
exploration areas. This re-entry of the cultural institutions subverts the superficial
division between culture and politics. In Kaiso, on the shores of Lake Albert, the oil
company Tullow Oil drilled exploration wells that were later claimed by resident cultural
leaders to have destroyed important shrines of local spirits. This article has shown how
claiming cultural sites is another register in the oil arena with which less powerful actors
can have a say in the negotiations. While this claim did not enjoy the full support of the
whole community and was perceived by some as being motivated by economic gains, the
claimants could draw on a shift in the perception of world heritage to include landscapes,
thereby dropping a “Western” bias towards material cultural evidence. This widening of
the definition of cultural heritage sites has made culture – next to politics, economics, or
the environment – a relevant factor to consider in big infrastructural projects such as oil
exploration and production.
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Notes
1. Both Ngassa wells were intended to access the same reservoir underneath. It can happen
during oil exploration that more than one well needs to be drilled to gain access to the
oil.
2. Profitable land in this case refers to land with proven, estimated, or even speculated oil
deposits underneath it, as well as land that is in the greater vicinity of the oil deposits and
is expected to be used in infrastructural developments.
3. By oil region, we mean those parts of Uganda with oil fields and exploration activities
located in Western and Northern Uganda (particularly Hoima and Buliisa district and
West Nile).
4. The schedule lists sixty-five indigenous communities of Uganda as on 1 February 1926.
5. The Uganda Gazette, Vol CX. No.7 (2 February 2017), Supplement No. 2, Legal Notice No. 2
of 2017, setting up the Commission.
6. We see oil from a perspective that does not understand resources as mere material substances,
but rather as both objects and concepts that are developed within a certain ideational system.
Ferry and Limbert (2008) call this social and political process “resource-making.”
7. This differs from an understanding of claims as rights; for example, as rights to land.
8. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) can be narrowed down to three main principles: com-
panies have a responsibility for their social and environmental impact; companies are respon-
sible for their business partners; and companies need to manage their relationship with wider
society (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005: 503).
9. CSR and financialisation have been embraced by the oil industry, more particularly, Tullow
Oil, which is heavily dependent on international financial markets (Witte, 2018: 202). CSR
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is also relevant as part of oil companies’ “dis/entanglement” from/with the oil producing
countries (see Schritt and Witte, 2018). Tullow Oil had CSR programmes in Uganda that
included employing Ugandan workers (under so-called national or local content) and it
followed a rather old-fashioned philanthropic approach of building infrastructure like
schools and boreholes in communities close to oil exploration activities (Schritt and Witte,
2018; Witte, 2018: 186–189).
10. Additionally, it should be noted that this perspective of the power relations discounts the
agency of spirits that has been emphasised by local interlocutors. To them, this was a strong
power connection that extended beyond the powers of actors such as the state or the oil
companies. On some level, therefore, the subaltern or weak saw themselves as part of a
network of much more powerful actors.
11. Also see the UNESCO website (http://whc.unesco.org/en/activities/477/ (accessed 4 Novem-
ber 2019)). Uganda accepted the 1972 World Heritage Convention in 1987. UNESCO is
represented in Uganda with the Uganda National Commission for UNESCO, which was
established in 1963.
12. See http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1687/ (accessed 4 November 2019).
13. See The Uganda Gazette, Vol CX. No.7 (2 February 2017), Supplement No. 2, Legal Notice
No.2 of 2017, setting up the Commission.
14. Currently, Tullow is a non-operating partner and has sold most of its shares in Uganda.
15. Uganda National Roads Authority versus Irumba Asuman and Peter Magelah Constitutional
Appeal No. 02 of 2014.
16. Uganda National Roads Authority versus Irumba Asuman, 2014.
17. The Petroleum Exploration and Production Act was part of the Ministry of Energy and
Mineral Development. It has been replaced in 2015 by the Petroleum Authority of Uganda.
18. Ethnographic field notes by Annika Witte from a conference organised by the local NGO
RICE-WN in Nebbi in 2013.
19. Officially, Bunyoro and other former ancient kingdoms on Uganda’s territory are no longer
considered political entities and are officially only recognised as cultural institutions. All
kingdoms in Uganda were abolished in 1966 and were only allowed to be reinstalled in
1993, under the condition that they abstain from politics (Traditional Rulers (Restitution of
Assets and Properties) Act – 1993, (https://ulii.org/ug/legislation/consolidated-act/247,
accessed 21 January 2020)). Unsurprisingly, such a separation is not as clear-cut as the law
would make it seem. Nevertheless, it is a political decision that speaks to the enduring
importance of these kingdoms.
20. The social license to operate is not an actual license issued by an official institution. Rather, it
is a concept that points to the acceptance of the company and its image in the area in which it
operates (Gunningham et al., 2004).
21. Entrance to the camp is restricted and visitors had to be invited and announced to camp
management; upon arrival at the gate they had to sign in and undergo a baggage check and
an induction.
22. The oil companies are obliged to restore sites back to their “natural” state after using them for
drilling or building camps.
23. In oil production, a Christmas tree refers to a set of valves, spools, and fittings on top of an oil
well to direct and regulate pressure flows from the well.
24. The environmental impact assessment was not publicly available.
25. Runyoro word for male members of the red sparrow clan.
26. Runyoro word for female members of the red sparrow clan.
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27. Runyoro word which means “come home.” The other destroyed sites are called nsonga
ijomuka, mukogi mukoto, kibaale jya kiberekimu, mwija mboga’s house, mukogi mutaito,
jjwaliro lya ijumuka, kibaale kya mulindwa, jziba lya ijumuka, and nyanuhanga iboona.
28. As much as the oil project still lingers in the state of not-yet-ness, so can these cultural
heritage claims be dormant and possibly revive in new acts of claiming once the industry
picks up again.
References
Auge´ B and Nakayi R (2014) Eastern Africa: a new oil and gas frontier. The East African Review
48: 1–16.
Behrend H (2007) The rise of occult powers, AIDS and the roman catholic church in Western
Uganda. Journal of Religion in Africa 37(1): 41–158.
Bergs C and Peselmann A (2015) Aushandlung und Inwertsetzung der Kulturlandschaften
Erzgebirge und Mapungubwe. In: Groth S, Bendix RF and Spiller A (eds), Kultur als Eigentum:
Instrumente, Querschnitte und Fallstudien. Go€ttingen: Universita€tsverlag Go€ttingen, pp.
341–370.
Bierschenk T and Olivier de Sardan JP (1997) ECRIS: rapid collective inquiry for the investigation
of conflicts and strategic groups. Human Organization 56: 238–245.
Blowfield M and Frynas JG (2005) Setting new agendas: critical perspectives on corporate social
responsibility in the developing world. International Affairs 81(3): 499–513.
Boholm A and Corvelle H (2011) A relational theory of risk. Journal of Risk Research 14(2):
175–190.
Breglia L (2013) Living With Oil: Promises, Peaks, and Declines on Mexico’s Gulf Coast. Austin:
University of Texas Press.
Chenells R and Nadal C (2015) Submission to the African Commission: A Call for Legal Recog-
nition of Sacred Natural Sites and Territories, and Their Customary Governance Systems.
African Biodiversity Network, Gaia Foundation. Electronic document. Available at: https://
web.archive.org/web/20170630151557/http://www.gaiafoundation.org/CalltoAfricanCommis
sion_summary.pdf (accessed 4 January 2020).
Civic Response on Environment and Development (CRED) (2015) Up Against Giants: Oil-
Influenced Land Injustices in the Albertine Graben in Uganda. Funded by Democratic Govern-
ance Facility. Electronic document. Available at: http://creduganda.org/wp-content/uploads/
2019/05/up-against-giants.pdf (accessed 21 January 2020).
Cotula L (2013) The Great African Land Grab? Agricultural Investments and the Global Food
System. London: Zed Books.
Ferry EE and Limbert ME (2008) Introduction. In: Ferry EE and Limbert ME (eds), Timely Assets:
The Politics of Resources and Their Temporalities. Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research
Press, pp. 3–24.
Gunningham N, Robert AK and Thornton D (2004) Social license and environmental protection:
Why businesses go beyond compliance. Law and Social Inquiry 29(2): 307–341.
Hauser-Scha€ublin B and Bendix R (2015) Welterbe. In: Groth S, Bendix RF and Spiller A (eds),
Kultur als Eigentum: Instrumente, Querschnitte und Fallstudien. Go€ttingen: Universita€tsverlag
Go€ttingen, pp. 51–59.
Joireman S (2007) Enforcing new property rights in Sub-Saharan Africa: the Ugandan constitution
and the 1998 Land Act. Comparative Politics 39(4): 463–480.
Lentz C (2013) Land, Mobility, and Belonging in West Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press.
240 Africa Spectrum 54(3)
Masquelier A (2002) Road mythographies: space, mobility, and the historical imagination in
postcolonial Niger. American Ethnologist 29(4): 829–856.
McAuslan P (2013) Land Law Reform in Eastern Africa: Traditional or Transformative? London:
Routledge.
Meinert L and Kjaer Mette A (2016) ‘Land belongs to the people of Uganda’: Politicians’ use of
land issues in the 2016 election campaigns. Journal of East African Studies 10(4): 769–788.
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) (2012) Oil and Gas Revenue
Management Policy. Kampala: Government of Uganda.
Ministry of Gender Labour and Social Development (2006) The Uganda National Culture Policy.
Kampala: Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development.
Ministry of Lands Housing and Urban Development (2006) Uganda National Land Use Policy.
Kampala: Ministry of Lands Housing and Urban Development.
Mugambwa JA (2007) A comparative analysis of land tenure law reform in Uganda and Papua
New Guinea. Journal of South Specific Law 11: 1.
Mwebaza R (1999) How to integrate Statutory and customary tenure? The Uganda case. Paper
presented at the DFIDWorkshop on Land Rights and Sustainable Development in Sub-Saharan
Africa, 16–19 February 1999, Berkshire, UK.
Nakayi R (2015) The perceived protection of tenants on registered land against evictions: an
assessment of the legal challenges faced by victims of land evictions in Kampala and Wakiso
District. PILAC Working Paper No.4. Kampala: Public Interest Law Clinic, Makerere
University
NAPE (2012) Action Oriented Research to Strengthen Bunyoro Kingdom to Defend Her Cultural
Heritage From Negative Impacts of Oil and Gas Industry Development in Uganda. Electronic
Document. Available at: https://www.nape.or.ug/publications/ecosystems-restoration/4-
action-oriented-research-2012/file (accessed 7 December 2019).
Naringiyimana J, William M and Rutanga M (2019) Oil politics and land tenure changes in
Uganda: understanding the curse of dispossession in the Albertine region. African Social
Science Review 10(1): 7.
National Planning Authority (2013) Uganda National Vision 2040. Electronic document. Avail-
able at: https://web.archive.org/web/20180120072544/http://npa.ug/uganda-vision-2040/
(accessed 21 February 2020).
Okello E (2019) Bunyoro Kingdom Calls for Protection of Cultural Sites in Albertine Graben.
Uganda Radio Network. Electronic Document. Available at: https://ugandaradionetwork.net/
story/bunyoro-kingdom-calls-for-protection-of-cultural-sites-in-albertine-graben- (accessed 7
October 2019).
Rajak D (2011) In Good Company: An Anatomy of Corporate Social Responsibility. Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
Reed K (2009) Crude Existence: The Politics of Oil in Northern Angola. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Sawyer S (2004) Crude Chronicles: Indigenous Politics, Multinational Oil, and Neoliberalism in
Ecuador. Durham, London: Duke University Press.
Schritt J (2016) Crude talking: the politics of naming, blaming and claiming in oil-age Niger. In:
Riedke E, Engel U and Rottenburg R (eds), The Ordering Power of Narratives. Working Papers
of the DFG Priority Programme 1448, NR. 21. University of Halle and University of Leipzig,
pp. 29–33.
Schritt J and Witte A (2018) Standardized capitalism? Negotiating the oil industry’s dis/entangle-
ment in Niger and Uganda. Economy and Society 47(3): 428–452.
Nakayi and Witte 241
Scott JC (1985) Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Shivji IG (1998) Contradictory perspectives on rights and justice in the context of land tenure
reform in Tanzania. Tanzania Zanami 4(1): 57–96.
Stoffle R, Nieves ZM, Amy E, et al. (2004) Shifting risks: Hoover dam bridge impacts on
American Indian sacred landscapes. In: Boholm A˚ and Ragnar L (eds), Facility Siting: Risk,
Power and Identity in Land Use Planning. London: Earthscan, pp. 127–143.
Troutt E, Mark MQ, Kisamba-Mugerwa W, et al. (1992) The dynamics of the land market and the
issue of compensation in Uganda. Access to land and other natural resources in Uganda.
Research Policy Development Project. Research Paper No. 5. Kampala: Makerere Institute
of Social Research and Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Tullow Oil Plc (2007) 2007 Results: 12 March 2008. Electronic document. Available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20171213180753/http://www.tullowoil.com/Media/docs/
default-source/3_investors/2007_full_year_results_presentation.pdf?sfvrsn¼2 (accessed 21
January 2020).
Uganda Electricity Transmission Company Ltd. (UETC) and SMEC International PTY Ltd.
(SMEC) (2011) Review and update of Environmental and Social Impact Assessment for 137
km Kawanda – Masaka 220 kV Transmission Line. Kampala: Uganda Electricity Transmission
Company Ltd.
UNESCO (1972) Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heri-
tage. Electronic document. Available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/conventiontext/ (accessed
21 January 2020).
UNESCO (2008) Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Conven-
tion. Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heri-
tage. Electronic document. Available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/guidelines (accessed 21
January 2020).
Visser W (2008) Corporate social responsibility in developing countries. In: Crane A, Matten D,
McWilliams A, Soon J and Siegel D (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Respon-
sibility. Online publication 2009. Available at: https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199211593.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199211593-e-021 (accessed 19
December 2019).
von Weichs R (2013) Die Ru¨ckkehr der Ko¨nige von Uganda: Politische Kultur und Moderne in
Afrika. Bielefeld: Transcript.
Vorho¨lter J (2014) Youth at the Crossroads: Discourses on Socio-Cultural Change in Post-War
Northern Uganda. Go¨ttingen: Universita¨tsverlag Go¨ttingen.
Welker M and Wood D (2011) Shareholder activism and alienation. Current Anthropology 52(S3):
S57–S69.
Wiegratz J (2010) Fake capitalism? The dynamics of neoliberal moral restructuring and
pseudo-development: the case of Uganda. Review of African Political Economy 37(124):
123–137.
Wily LA (2013) Enclosure revisited: putting the global land rush in historical perspective. In:
Allen T, Keulertz M, Sojam S and Warner J (eds), Handbook of Land and Water Grabs in
Africa: Foreign Direct Investment and Food and Water Security. New York: Routledge, pp.
11–23.
Witte A (2017) Bright prospects or an ominous future: anticipating oil in Uganda. Tsantsa 22:
26–35.
242 Africa Spectrum 54(3)
Witte A (2018) An Uncertain Future – Anticipating Oil in Uganda. Go¨ttingen: Go¨ttingen Uni-
versity Press.
World Bank (2017) Supporting PolicyDialogue onNational Resettlement Policy inUganda. Defend-
ing OUR Land: An Assessment of the Law, Resettlement Policies and Practices on Land Acqui-
sition in Uganda. Report No. ACS22135. Unpublished Document. Washington: World Bank.
Constitution and Laws
The Constitution of Uganda, 1995.
The Land Act, Cap 227 (as amended).
Land Acquisition Act Cap 226.
The Land Reform Decree, 1975 (repealed).
The Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Act 2013.
Traditional Rulers (Restitution of Assets and Properties) Act – 1993.
Author Biographies
Rose Nakayi is a senior lecturer at the School of Law Makerere University, Uganda. To date, her
research has explored the dynamics of land law reforms in developing countries in Africa and how
these intersect with various social and political realities in a given country.
Annika Witte is an independent researcher currently working for an international NGO in
Uganda. Before, she has worked as a lecturer and researcher at the Institute of Social and Cultural
Anthropology at the University of Go€ttingen. Her research interest covers the topics of oil in
Uganda and the use of agrochemicals in (peri-)urban agriculture in Cameroon. She currently lives
and works in Uganda.
Kontroverse um kulturelles Erbe auf lukrativem Land: Der Fall
der Ngassa-Bohrlo¨cher in Ugandas O¨lregion
Zusammenfassung
In der Explorationsphase des ugandischen O¨lprojektes kam es zu einer Kontroverse u¨ber Probe-
bohrungen auf dem Gela¨nde wichtiger Geisterschreine am Rande des Albertsees. Wa¨hrend die
O¨lfirmen und der Staat den Marktwert des Grundstu¨cks betrachteten, betonten die Kla¨ger dessen
Wert als kulturelles Erbe und stellten damit eine Verbindung zu der internationalen Diskussion
u¨ber Kulturerbe her. In diesem Artikel wird argumentiert, dass kulturelle Institutionen wie das
Bunyoro-Ko¨nigreich und die Kla¨ger aus dem betroffenen Dorf das kulturelle Erbe als Verhand-
lungsgrundlage nutzten, um sich Geho¨r zu verschaffen und Verhandlungsmacht bezu¨glich des
Projektes zu erlangen. Der Artikel zeigt, wie die Ausdehnung der Definition von kulturellem Erbe
– weg von einer Bevorzugung gebauter Sta¨tten – Kultur neben Politik, Wirtschaft und Umwelt als
wichtigen Faktor etabliert hat, den es bei Projekten der Rohstoffindustrie zu beru¨cksichtigen gilt.
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